Research on Linux kernel attack techniques, in which cybersecurity firm Theory participated, has been accepted by the international security conference NDSS. This research is noteworthy for presenting a new attack method that can lead to privilege escalation even in the latest Linux kernel environments with enhanced security measures.

Theory announced that the paper 'DirtyFree: Simplified Data-Oriented Programming in the Linux Kernel,' co-authored by one of its researchers, was released at NDSS. This research was a joint effort between researchers from the Max Planck Institute in Germany and Theory. NDSS is considered one of the major academic conferences in the field of information security.

With the recent introduction of protection techniques such as KCFI into the Linux kernel, traditional attacks that alter the execution flow of programs are becoming increasingly difficult. Consequently, data-oriented programming attacks that compromise system privileges by modifying data values or structures have been discussed as an alternative. However, the existing method had limitations in actual application because it required conditions such as memory address leakage or random address writing.

The 'DirtyFree' proposed by the research team is a method that forcibly frees memory and injects a fake object intended by the attacker into that location. It is designed to allow manipulation of internal kernel data structures without complex preconditions. During the research process, 14 new objects usable for attacks were identified in the kernel heap area.

This technique also demonstrated its scope of application in actual vulnerability verification. The research team proved the feasibility of attacks targeting 24 Linux kernel vulnerabilities, showing that DirtyFree is not a method limited to specific cases. This highlights the importance of kernel security checks in various industries that operate based on the Linux kernel, such as servers, the cloud, and embedded devices.

This study is significant in that it went beyond merely presenting attack techniques to address defensive measures as well. Theori explained that they implemented two defense mechanisms capable of blocking the attack and suppressed performance degradation to a low level. This research is interpreted as suggesting that kernel security must expand beyond simple vulnerability patches to encompass the entirety of memory management structures and object processing methods.